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THE SOUTHERN SUDAN 
THE souTHERN SuDAN has been torn by internal and external struggles 
for most of its long history. The area has seldom been unified by its own 
leaders or by those seeking to impose their rule upon the southerners. 
One of the greatest experiments in national integration is now underway 
in that region. Certain progress has been made, but much remains to 
be done. The struggle for national integration in the huge and under-
developed Sudan is very difficult, with ethnic and geographical factors 
weighing heavily. The problem has been complicated by the deep roots 
of national division planted by British colonialism and nourished by 
changing governments in Khartoum and by global powers which have 
used the southern Sudan for their own ends. Here we will review the 
past in order to judge the future prospects for national integration. 
Early History 
Two themes have dominated the history of the southern Sudan as 
long as that history has been recorded. The first is isolation: the region 
has never maintained easy contact with the areas around it. The second 
theme is exploitation and pillage: foreign powers have been interested 
in ivory and slaves from the time of the high civilizations of ancient 
Egypt and Meroe until comparatively recent times. The exploitation 
increased the isolation, and the isolation made the southern Sudanese 
prime candidates for more savage treatment by outsiders. 
Internal divisions did not help. Some of the cultures, such as the 
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Shilluk, were organized with centralized political authority, while others, 
such as the important Nuer, were characterized by a decentralized 
political system. The Shilluk sought to expand their political domi-
nance by subjugati~ peoples with a less complex sociopolitical organ-
ization. The Nuer and other cattle-rearing people always wanted more 
land for grazing. Thus, interethnic skirmishes and, sometimes, full scale 
wars also mark the history of the region. Such strife persists, on occasion, 
to the present. 
Some scholars go to these early days and conditions to seek the roots 
of the recent conflict in the southern Sudan. Although this background 
is important, the nature of the conflict has more relevant, recent sources. 
Many of the causes are to be found in the period of foreign occupation 
and colonization. In fact, the civil war in the South was qualitatively 
different from the struggles of earlier centuries because it represented 
the first major attempt by southerners to unite across ethnic lines in 
fighting their perceived enemy. Since I view the present situation as 
different from that of ancient history, I start this review in 1820, when 
the era of Turko-Egyptian rule began. 
The Turkiyah, 1820-1885 
Early in the nineteenth century, Mohammed Ali Pasha, viceroy of 
Egypt, was consolidating his hold on the northeast corner of the African 
continent. To aid in his conquests, he needed men and money - that is, 
slaves to serve as soldiers, and slaves to sell. Agricultural, mineral, and 
animal resources were also in high demand. So that these needs might 
be supplied, he decided to conquer the Sudan. 
Ali Pasha's two sons were delegated with the military conquest and 
with the procurement of slaves. Ibrahim went south, up the White Nile, 
to raid Dinka country, and Ismail pillaged the Blue Nile, past Sennar. 
The flow of slaves, cattle, camels, and hides began slowly but then picked 
up. The raids for slaves went south of Malakal on the Sobat River, and 
deep inside the Dinka country on the White Nile, presumably Nuer 
and Shilluk alike were captured. 
Except for certain short periods, the rule during the Turkiyah was 
brutal and corrupt. The opportunity to become rich through the slave 
trade was not overlooked, and the Turko-Egyptians would give con-
tracts to those interested in going south for such activities. Such con-
tracts could be acquired more easily in Khartoum, by bribery. 
In the 1830s the European antislavery movement was growing as 
European mercantilists wanted to drive from competition those rival 
economies based on the slave system. Some European travelers visited 
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the Sudan, and many of them sent messages of protest to the Turko-
Egyptian rulers, demanding an end to slavery. Although the adminis-
tration later made a show of ending the trade, little was actually done. 
The military and economic need for slaves was still great, and cap-
tured "rebels" and "confiscated slaves" were sent to Egypt to shore up 
the Turkiyah. If anything, the volume and devastation of the slave raids 
increased. At one point, Zubayr Wad Rahma, one of the biggest slave-
traders operating in the Bahr el Ghazal region, organized a successful 
resistance to a military force of Turko-Egyptians. Zubayr's strength was 
subsequently acknowledged when his actions were forgiven and he was 
made governor of the region, but his personal interests in slaving con-
tinued to make him a constant rival to the authority in Khartoum. 
During the much heralded reign of Gordon Pasha, the slave traffic 
was partly disrupted but by no means stopped. When Gordon left Khar-
toum, in 1879, the slave trade was booming once again. When he 
returned, in 1884, one of his first acts was to abolish the law which he 
had written to stop the slave trade. This was done to appease the Mah-
dist movement, which was then in full swing. 
The Mahdiya, 1885-1898 
After Khartoum fell, in January, 1885, the armies of the Mahdi were 
busy consolidating their victories and making efforts to expand their 
territory - in particular, to the east and the north. Slavery was toler-
ated by the Mahdi as long as the slaves were nonbelievers in Islam. Slaves 
were also important, both economically and militarily, to the Mahdi 
and his caliph. Mahdist authority was extended to Raja£ (near Juba, 
in Equatoria) , but the control was not deep or lasting. The trade in 
ivory and slaves from the South continued. Under the Turkiyah there 
had been brutal exploitation; under the Mahdiya the theme in the 
South was basically a return to isolation. 
It is important to distinguish the domestic slavery under the Mahdiya 
from the "gang" slavery of the European or Turko-Egyptian slavers, 
who saw slaves simply as a commodity. Indeed, the Khalifa prohibited 
commercial slaving. 
Anglo-Egyptian Period, 1898-1930 
In the early years of the Anglo-Egyptian period, the English (who 
were, after all, the real rulers) employed a two-phase operation in deal-
ing with the South. The first phase was military "pacification." Subse-
quent to the pathetic confrontation of French and British troops at 
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Fashoda, it was determined, by Europeans, that the British would rule 
the South. The vast spaces in the South and the decentralized political 
systems of most of the southern cultures made for many difficulties in 
the imposition of the British "pacification" program. In the first three 
decades of British rule, no fewer than ten punitive military expeditions 
were sent out against the Nuer. Other revolts are recorded for the Dinka, 
Beir, Anuak, Latuka, Toposa, and Didinga in the same period.l 
The British, recognizing that armed repression would not be suffi-
cient, arranged to employ Evans-Pritchard, the well-known anthropolo-
gist, to study the social and political life of southern peoples (particularly 
the "troublesome" uer) so that they could be "better" administered. 
The civil secretary, H. S. MacMichael (later to become governor gen-
eral), in a little-known memorandum about the use of anthropological 
material and methods in colonial administration, said that anthropo-
logical techniques "will be conceded to be an essential equipment of 
the administrator responsible for the tutelage of primitive races whose 
mental processes are not as ours." MacMichael arranged for Evans-
Pritchard to study the Nuer, who were in sporadic armed revolt. Mac-
Michael provided the anthropologist with a questionnaire which included 
questions on political organization, weapons used, and names of chiefs. 
These techniques played a significant, yet little-recognized, role in the 
British "pacification" of the southern peoples. 
Once the area was brought under firmer control, the second phase of 
British colonialism was introduced - the age-old technique of subju-
gation; divide and rule. The colonial authorities drew a map of the 
southern Sudan and partitioned it into eight spheres of missionary ac-
tivity, much as modern engineers divide maps into tracts for petroleum 
prospecting. Until that time most southerners practiced their traditional 
religions, and relatively few were Islamicized or Christianized. In ad-
dition to proselytizing the population the missions sought to teach 
obedience to government authority.2 
Not only was the southern Sudan internally divided by the mission-
aries and by efforts to encourage "tribalism" and ethnic differentiation; 
the region was also fragmented from the northern Sudan by an official 
policy designed to discourage any sense of national unity. A deliberate 
effort was made to create division within the Sudan. Serious thought 
was given to having the Southern Sudan join with Uganda in the distant 
I. Mohammed Omer Beshir, Th e Southern Sudan: Background to Conflict (Khar-
toum: AI Ayam Press, 1968), p. 19. 
2. Muddathir Abde1-Rahim, Th e Development of British Policy in the Southem 
Sudan, 1899-1947 (Khartoum: Khartoum University Press, 1968) , p. 5. 
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future. The missionaries spoke of the evil Arab slavers, om1ttmg any 
reference to the European and Turkish financiers who stood behind 
the slave trade when it was at its peak. The Missionaries also spoke 
zealously of the dangers of communism. 
The 1920 Milner Report stressed that the Southern Sudan should be 
kept free from northern Sudanese and Muslim influences, and that 
Christian holidays should be recognized. The Passports and Permits 
Ordinance of 1922, in keeping with the Milner recommendations, strict-
ly controlled access to the Southern Sudan. Not only did the ordinance 
control travel into the region; it was also highly restrictive in allowing 
southerners to go north. This portion, known as the "closed districts 
ordinance," was applied to other areas in the Sudan which proved 
troublesome to the colonialists. 
Another objective of the British was to eliminate Arabic in the South 
and to train southern civil servants in English. A British district com-
missioner cynically observed that the southerners were not allowed to 
have "foreign" Arabic names, but that it was fine if the missionaries 
gave them "foreign" English or Italian names when they were baptized. 
By 1935 the colonialist policy had become even more absurd. Arabic titles 
such as sheikh and sultan were prohibited. The Greek merchants oper· 
ating in the South were forbidden from selling Arab clothing. And 
tagia and emma ~ standard northern Sudanese dress ~ were to be 
eliminated. 
As a result of these deliberate policies, the South continued to be 
isolated from the North. And those who were not mission-trained were 
isolated from each other by the conscious reinforcement of traditional 
ethnicity. Also, there could be seen already a tiny English-speaking 
missionized class of civil servants who implemented British colonial 
policies. 
Other differences began to appear between the North and the South. 
A railway was built to the north of Khartoum, to the east, and to the 
west. (Only very recently did the railway reach the South, when one 
provincial capital was connected to the network. The other southern 
capitals are served by seasonal roads and by an inadequate river-steamer 
service.) Industrialization ~ to the limited degree that a colonial power 
would grant ~ occurred entirely in the North and was basically for 
processing raw materials and for light manufacturing. The already 
backward South had no means of changing this situation. 
The Revolution of 1924 in Khartoum, led by an Islamicized southerner, 
Ali Abdel Latif, came close to succeeeding. The failure of nationalist Egyp-
tian troops to JOin the movement was all that kept the mutiny from 
driving the British out. The British were much shaken by this event 
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and realized that if they failed to involve southerners in the administra-
tion, other such revolts might follow. By 1930, a number of primary 
schools and several intermediate schools had been opened to provide 
training to southerners. 
Nevertheless, in January, 1930, the office of the civil secretary in 
Khartoum circulated a memorandum in which the southern policy of 
the previous decades was reviewed and restated. It was to "build up a 
series of self-contained racial or tribal units" in order to effect the im-
plementation of the proven colonial method of the British of indirect 
rule.3 The conscious goals of isolating the South from the North, isolat-
ing southern cultures from each other, and isolating southern civil 
servants and the educated elite from the people were effectively approved 
and maintained. 
Anglo-Egyptian Period, 1930-1956 
Some time after the memorandum of 1930, the British began to see 
that their policy, although fine from the point of view of colonial ad-
ministration, had certain disadvantages. While it was best, during the 
early period of colonialism, to keep people divided, the British saw 
that larger national entities would have to be devised. As late as 1946 
the Khartoum authorities were trying to decide whether the southern 
region should be linked with the northern Sudan or with East Africa, 
or perhaps be divided to go with both. It should be clear from the 
1946 revision of southern policy that the British had been so successful 
in dividing the region that even they did not know what to do with 
the pieces!4 
At this time the British, at war with other European imperialist 
powers, were seeking to economize in every possible way. The end of 
colonialism began when Europeans became weak from fighting each 
other for global spheres of influence. But the sophisticated colonial 
thinkers were already formulating a neocolonial policy that would allow 
them to maintain their economic hold on the Sudan but have Sudanese 
do the "dirty work" of keeping the people "in line." The policy-mak~rs 
went into reverse gear and suddenly sought to integrate the South with 
the North and to break down the isolation of the South that they had 
been building up for the previous four decades. This is not to s~y 
that the British were planning to grant the Sudan indepen~ence m 
the 1940s, but that they were starting to see the collapse of their whole 
3. Beshir, Southern Sudan, p. 115. 
4. See Abde1-Rahim, Development of British Policy in the Southern Sudan, P· 43. 
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empire. The essence of the "new" 1946 policy was that since geo-
graphical and economic factors rendered the southerners to be 
inextricably bound for future development to the middle-eastern and 
Arabicised Northern Sudan, ... they shall, by educational and economic 
development, be equipped to stand up for themselves in the future as 
socially and economically the equals of their partners of the Northern 
Sudan in the Sudan of the future.G 
With a sweep of the magic wand the colonial administrators hoped 
to rectify the immense damage they had done with their earlier reckless 
policies. There is some indication that they thought that they might 
have enough time to rework the administration of the South. J. H. T. 
Wilson, the district commissioner of the Jur River District, said: 
I regard it as of importance that our target in the South should be 
federation with the North as partners on an equal footing in the self-
governing Sudan of the future in the same way as we regard our target 
in the North as a self-governing Northern Sudan within 20 years.o 
Contrary to British plans, the Egyptian government was overthrown 
in 1952 by the Free Officers Society, and the British puppet, King Farouk, 
was sent into exile. The impact of the Egyptian coup was crucial to 
the Sudan, and by 1955 plans were being made for full independence 
in January, 1956 - from the British point of view, a decade ahead of 
schedule. 
On the eve of independence, the southern regions broke into armed 
and bloody revolt. Although the revolt needs much careful study and 
comment, it was fundamentally the product of the long-standing and 
well-cultivated suspicions between the North and the South. The 
southerners saw northerners as merchants, or sometimes, after the early 
southern policy had been reversed, as administrators. The decades of 
colonial and missionary contact had spawned and encouraged animosi-
ties between the regions. When independence was imminent, many 
southern leaders feared that they would be dominated by the North, 
and that their present underdevelopment would only continue. The 
revolt spread, and many northerners were killed. Equally brutal repres-
sion finally quelled the incipient movement for regional separation. 
Burning emotions were left to smolder. 
5. Ibid., p. 46. 
6. Quoted in Beshir, Southern Sudan, p. 124. 
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Independence, 1956-1969 
Self-determination, coming on the first day of 1956, had lasted only 
two years when the parliamentary government was toppled by a strong 
pro-Western _Sudanese army officer, General Abboud. (From 1958 to 
1967 the_ Umted States pumped about _$130 million into the country.) 
Meanwhile many southern leaders and Intellectuals were convinced that 
a protracted gu~rril~a struggle was the only way to gain autonomy and 
true self-determmauon for the South. The Sudan African National 
Union (SAND) was organized in the early 1960s to achieve this goal. 
During Abboud's rule there was regular military activity in the South 
to control the ambushes and attacks by guerrilla units of SANU. Little 
effort was made to check the excesses of the northern troops; their 
brutality only made the situation worse. 
At the University of Khartoum steps were taken to address the issue 
that was tearing the infant nation apart. In October, 1964, students and 
teachers met to discuss the situation in the South. The military govern-
ment, frightened by the gathering of students and political leaders, re-
fused them permission to meet. This refusal stimulated a sharp reaction 
from the students, then from the workers, and finally from the popu-
lation as a whole, against the unpopular government. Violent demon-
strations culminated in the overthrow of the junta and the return to 
parliamentary procedure. 
A few weeks later the Sudanese prime minister received a letter from 
SAND stating that it would like to return to "our motherland" on the 
condition that the war effort be halted, SANU be recognized, a general 
amnesty be granted, southern refugees be protected, and certain specified 
and sincere efforts be made to reduce the inequalities existing between 
the two regions. SANU also called for all political parties in the Sudan 
to come together at a round-table conference, to stop the fighting, and 
to get on with nation-building. The spirit of the 1964 October revolu-
tion was still strong, and by December an agreement had been reached 
about the major elements in the SANU appeal. In January, 1965, SANU 
laid down a short list of further preconditions, stressing an open forum 
and the imperative task of ending the warfare. From March 16 to March 
25, 1965, the round-table conference was held in Khartoum, and the 
eight delegated political parties reached an agreement. The resolutions 
that were passed expressed a feeling of cautious optimism, even though 
some of the central issues had not been fully confronted.7 After the 
round-table conference, much maneuvering, splitting, and merging took 
7. For the specifics of the resolutions, see ibid., pp. 183-85. 
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place among the southern political parties as some southern leaders 
sought to establish themselves in the most advantageous positions vis-a-vis 
the northern political organizations. 
Some northern elements were fearful of strong autonomy for the South, 
and they generated a spirit of conservative regionalism and distrust of 
southerners. This motivation was at a peak when soldiers in the Suda-
nese army in the South killed a great number of the educated elite in 
Juba in a notorious massacre. An assault at a wedding party of elites 
in Wau had the same purpose and effect. The work of months of 
negotiation and careful optimism was totally undone, and the war 
flared again. Both sides could think only of military victory and re-
venge, and interpreted talk of political negotiation as a sign of weakness. 
ow the southern rebel forces, having acquired automatic weapons 
from the deteriorating Simba movement in Zaire, were better armed. 
By this time two main trends were emerging within the southern 
movement. One, represented by the Southern Front, held that a final 
resolution must come from negotiation between equals, not from separa-
tion. The other trend was represented by SANU, the Anzania Front, 
and the African National Union. Distinctions among these groupings 
are hard to draw since their leadership and platforms have been subject 
to considerable change. Nonetheless, their general outlook was that 
complete separation through armed struggle was the only solution. Be-
yond these fundamental differences in political goals among the elites of 
the South, there were also ethnic divisions and divisions based upon terri-
tory under the control of, or contested by, factions in the guerrilla army. 
After the resolutions of the round-table conference had failed, the 
political parties of the North struggled for influence under the restored 
system of parliamentary democracy. Swinging from the political center 
to the right wing, the government in Khartoum was weak and could 
barely keep itself together much less solve the newly inflamed problems 
in the South. Elections were held in the spring of 1968 to attempt to 
create a viable government in Khartoum. William Deng, who had been 
president of SANU since its formation, won a seat but was murdered 
by government troops just after the elections. 
Independence, 1969 to the present 
And so it went until May 25, 1969, when Gaafar Nimeri took over 
with a military coup. The Sudanese Communist party and progressive 
elements in the army were instrumental in the planning which led to 
the successful coup. On June 9, 1969, the new junta issued a declara-
tion in which it promised to solve the southern problem once and for 
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all. In the first sentence of the declaration, the basic problem in the 
South was defined as imperialism and the manipulation of the South 
in order to divide the Sudan. This analysis had long been made by 
progressive elements in the South.8 The policy of separation was seen as 
fundamentally racist and ultranationalist. The central theme of the 
solution was the concept of regional autonomy, which was quite similar 
to the proposal made at the round-table conference.9 In actuality the 
Sudanese Communist party had made a similar proposal in the late 
1950s, after the first revolt had taken place; but at that time most people 
only wanted revenge, and few paid attention to the idea of regional 
autonomy. The declaration of June 9 "was welcomed with jubilation 
by the masses of the southern people. Huge demonstrations of support 
were organized by them in all major southern towns as well as by 
southern communities in the North," reported the minister of southern 
affairs, Joseph Garang, appointed to one of the highest positions ever 
held by a southerner in Khartoum.1° 
Many in the guerrilla movement supported the position of separation, 
and sometimes their support reached astonishing levels. A previously 
unpublished letter written to the South African ambassador by the Nile 
Provisional Government (Anya•Nya) was captured by Sudanese army 
forces who overran an Anya-Nya base area (Owing Kibol and Moroto) 
in the southern forests. This letter, dated August 27, 1970, mentioned 
the Provisional Government's "whole hearted support for your policy 
of apartheid" since "we are for the separation of races." The letter 
also indicated that the writers felt that both they and the South African 
government were fighting "Arab communism." The letter asked for 
financial support, travel papers, clothes, food, and medicine, and advised 
that such support should be sent through the Malawi diplomatic mailbag 
or the American embassy in Uganda. The Nile provisional government 
also asked for mercenaries from South Africa and suggested that they 
come to Uganda as tourists on British, American, or French passports. 
The letter indicated, in strong terms, that the provisional government 
would never accept negotiation for federation, and that it looked for-
ward to a continuing Middle East war so that it could join the Israelis 
m their fight against the Arabs. 
8. As distinguished from the two other elements in southern politics o~tlin~.~ 
in Joseph U. Garang, "The Dilemma of the Southern Intellectual: Is It Justtfied. • 
mimeographed (Khartoum: Ministry for Southern Affairs, 1971). 
9. Ministry of National Guidance, Policy Statement on the Southern Question 
(The june 9 Declaration), 1969. 
10. Garang, "On Imperialist Conspiracies against the Sudan," mimeographed 
(Khartoum: Ministry for Southern Affairs, 1971) . 
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Another letter from the Nile Provisional Government, confiscated in 
the same Sudanese army assault, and dated similarly, was addressed to 
the Malawi high commission in Nairobi. The purpose of this letter was 
to explain a number of divisions between the Nile Provisional Govern-
ment and the so-called Anyidi Provisional Government, a split-off from 
one of the numerous factions within the South. The letter also asked 
for money, for more ammunition, clothes, and travel documents. The 
Nile Provisional Government asked the Malawi government to permit 
South African aid to come through their country, and to raise the issue 
of the southern Sudan at the Organization of African Unity. The pro-
visional government stated that Malawi's prime minister, Hastings Banda, 
"is the first who wanted to raise an army to fight the Arabs in the 
Sudan," and that "Arabs are not Africans." These statements point 
out the racist ideology espoused by this significant faction within the 
southern Sudanese movement. Such blatant racism and division are the 
logical results of both missionary and colonial enterprises which had 
"divide and rule" as the keystone of their policies. Even when they 
sought to reverse the policy, it was a case of too little and too late. 
As time wore on, the declaration of June 9 became ineffectual. By 
1971 many southerners thought that it was just another empty promise 
from the North. Joseph Garang gave public addresses and sought to 
have refugees return as if the war were over - but it wasn't. Units of 
Sudanese army were still operating in the South, and little real change 
had occurred. Divisions appeared between the President and Garang's 
Ministry for southern affairs, which sometimes lacked sufficient funds 
to do all that it was supposed to do. The five-year development plan 
for the South was fine, but it was not fully implemented. The Amnesty 
Law was extended, but few returned. The English-language Nile Mirror 
was published so that there would be a medium in which to discuss 
the many dimensions of the southern Sudan, and so that there would 
be a newspaper especially for southerners. A series of pamphlets on the 
southern Sudan was also published by the Public Relations Bureau of 
the Ministry for Southern Affairs. But the war went on. A broad infra-
structure of clubs, unions, and social organizations was initiated. Al-
though one side of the government was making peace, one side was still 
at war, so the mass organizations never took a deep hold, despite the 
great effort and expense. 
At the time of the 1969 coup, the Middle East was just cooling off 
from the 1967 war of expansion by Israeli Zionists, who wanted to keep 
the Arab nations off-balance and in disarray. The Nimeri regime was, 
at first, strongly anti-Zionist and anti-American, as were most Arab 
countries at the time. Diplomatic relations with the United States were 
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broken. Major private commercial firms and monopolistic capitalist 
concerns were nationalized, further angering the Western powers. The 
situation in the southern Sudan was just what the imperialist and Zion-
ist powers were looking for. With the conservative, pro-Western Abboud 
regime in power, the West barely uttered a word against the military 
atrocities in the South; but with the Nimeri regime in place in Khartoum, 
Western propagandists (like Time magazine) fell over backwards point-
ing to a "Soviet Viet Nam," and they mobilized their "humanitarian" 
organizations to allign world opinion against Nimeri. 
A major propaganda offensive was carried out by West German and 
American "charitable" associations. The Israelis pumped in arms by 
way of their ally in the Horn of Africa, Haile Selassie, and a number of 
southern rebel leaders received military training in Israel. American 
aid was routed to the rebels through Saudi Arabia, then to Ethiopia 
and Uganda. The notorious West German mercenary, Rolf Steiner, who 
had fought in Algeria, Viet Nam, and Biafra, found his way to the 
southern Sudan, where he gave military training to improve the over-all 
fighting effectiveness of the southern guerrillas. During Steiner's trial 
in Khartoum, after his capture in Uganda, it became quite clear that 
he was the very epitome of an imperialist tool (even though his own 
anti-Semitism made him blanch at working with the Zionists). His 
death sentence was later commuted by the Nimeri government. 
By aggravating the southern problems, the Western powers tried to 
discredit Nimeri's rule in Khartoum and to bring him down. Many 
northerners were already upset about Nimeri's plan to federate with 
Egypt and Libya. On July 19, 1971, certain politici.ans and. milit~ry 
men toppled Nimeri in a bloodless coup. What surpnsed the lm~ena~­
ists was that the coup-makers were even further to the left than N1men. 
Panic struck Washington, London, Cairo, and Tripoli. The leader of 
the coup, Hashim al-Atta, had little chance to survive. The regime was 
recognized by Iraq (but a plane that they sent to Khartoum was shot 
down over Saudi Arabia) . In three days a countercoup was mounted, 
and, after very heavy fighting in Khartoum, Atta was brought down and 
Nimeri, miraculously, was returned to the "People's Palace." Garang 
was implicated by a fast-acting military tribunal and, with dozens of 
others, was secretly executed. . . 
Nimeri then made an astounding about-face on the pohucal con-
tinuum. Much that he had favored became forbidden, and much. that 
he had opposed became favored. Commercial interests were denational-
ized and returned to former owners. The Middle East situation became 
much less important to the new government (one reason for the Black ~ep-
. . . D' 1 · 1 t'ons with the Umted tember mCldent m Khartoum) . 1p omauc re a 1 
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States were resumed. The Western powers were favored in Khartoum, 
at the expense of the Soviet Union. The huge English financial con-
glomerate Lonrho (London-Rhodesia) found good possibilities for busi-
ness, and was made exclusive buyer for English products in the Sudan. 
Imperialist support for the rebellion in the South fell off. The Anya-Nya 
forces could barely go on with their war. (Incidentally, the imperialist 
military aid was evaluated as insufficient to have ever achieved the 
goal of separation.) But Nimeri knew that he had to act on the south-
ern problem since it was partly his failures on this issue which had led 
to the problems of July 19, 1971. 
Haile Selassie offered to have the World Council of Churches act as 
mediator between representatives of the Sudan government and the 
southerners (there is still argument about who represented whom). The 
crucial difference between these meetings and the 1965 round-table con-
ference is that this time the imperialist powers desperately wanted a 
solution. Suddenly, in early 1972, the Khartoum offices of the Eritrean 
Liberation Front were closed down. This guerrilla movement had been 
fighting Haile Selassie's annexation of Eritrea for eleven years. Similarly 
the Selassie government closed down the offices of the southern Sudanese 
guerrillas in Ethiopia. Elsewhere, Idi Amin, in Uganda, abruptly ended 
relations with the Israelis (who, it is rumored, helped him to power 
in the first place!) . Everything was ready. 
At last, on March 27, 1972, the Addis Ababa Agreement was reached, 
and the shooting stopped. All peace-loving people rejoiced that the kill-
ing was over, and that the South might begin to develop. But the 
compromises which left the imperialists as big winners must not be 
forgotten. Moreover, the class structure in the Sudan is essentially un-
changed except that there are more people of southern origin in the 
Khartoum and southern governments - which, of course, is of great 
significance. The workers of the North must yet struggle for a decent 
wage and better living; the workers and peasants of the South must 
yet try to gain better training and opportunities. 
Basically the petty bourgeois sectors of the North and the South have 
come to terms with each other. The alliance of elites in the North and 
the South will yield some stability, but political factions in both regions 
are not going to stop seeking power for themselves. If the alliance serves 
the interests of the masses, there will be greater stability. If the alliance 
serves its own interests, the Addis Ababa Agreement may go the way of 
earlier agreements. There have already been some reports of abuses of 
power and position. 
In one of the most recent publications on the situation in tbi'southern 
Sudan, the ministry of foreign affairs has mentioned that "diversity" 
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and "discrepancy" remain the most conspicuous aspects of the problem.u 
That this problem has been alleviated cannot be questioned; the South 
has come a long way from the earlier fighting in the protracted war. 
But there is still a very long way to go. 
11. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Peace and Unity in the Sudan: An African Achieve-
ment (Khartoum: Khartoum University Press, 1973). 
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